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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID L. GROEN and ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
TRI-O, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20489 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Respondents (hereinafter separately referred to as "Groen" or "Rocky 
Mountain") assert that the prior decision of the Court in this matter, Groen vs. 
Tri-0, Inc., 667 P.2d 598 (Utah 1983) is determinative of the issues raised 
under Point I of Appellant's brief concerning the application of the doctrine of 
express warranty to the facts of this case. (Appellant is hereinafter referred 
to as "Tri-0"). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Respondents adopt Tri-0's statement as to the nature of the case. 
Course of Proceedings Below 
Respondents adopt Tri-0's statement of the course of the proceedings 
below. 
Statement of Facts 
Prior to the occurrence of the accident in question, Tri-0 entered 
into a contract with the Bureau of Land Management to string power lines near 
Wellington, Colorado. The BLM required that the work be done with the use of 
helicopters in order to preserve the environment. 
Tri-0 contracted with a helicopter company to string the power lines. 
However, the first pilot was incompetent and was terminated by Tri-0 (tr.711, 
745). The second pilot was competent, but due to a dispute with Tri-0 he left 
the job after a short period of time (tr.711-12). These and other problems put 
the job seriously behind schedule (tr.240). 
Subsequent to the departure of the second pilot, Tri-0 contacted Rocky 
Mountain and requested that Rocky Mountain supply a helicopter and pilot to 
continue the job. Rocky Mountain accepted the offer and entered into a contract 
with Tri-0 (Ex.18). Kenneth dinger, the Tri-0 representative who subsequently 
made the warranties to Groen, signed the contract on behalf of Tri-0 (tr.714). 
Pursuant to the contract, Rocky Mountain was to supply a pilot and helicopter 
and Tri-0 was to supply the ropes and other materials necessary to do the job 
(tr.745). Pursuant to the contract, Rocky Mountain sent Groen to the site to 
string the power lines. He was accompanied by another pilot, Joe Candlish who 
Groen was to train in the art of stringing power lines (tr.53). 
In stringing power lines with the use of a helicopter, the side of the 
aircraft is equipped with a frame. On the frame is a hook. A ten foot length 
of rope is attached to the hook. At the end of the ten foot rope is a ten pound 
swivel which minimizes the effects of twisting and provides sufficient weight in 
the event the rope must be discarded. Attached to the ten pound swivel is a 100 
foot length of rope. Attached to the 100 foot length of rope is a small two 
pound swivel with a diameter approximating the diameter of the rope. On the 
other side of the small swivel is a steel cable several miles in length which is 
wrapped around a large reel. As the helicopter strings the wire, the reel 
turns, permitting the release of the cable (tr.59-73). 
The electrical towers are equipped with "travellers." A traveller is 
merely a metal frame attached near the porcelain insulator on the tower. The 
traveller has a one-way door that will allow the rope to enter inside the frame, 
but will not allow the rope, once inside, to get out of the frame. The bottom 
portion of the traveller is equipped with pulleys that permit the rope, or 
cable, once inside the traveller, to be easily pulled (tr.59-73). 
With the rope and cable assembly attached, the helicopter flies 
sideways over the tower and drops the rope on a small arm attached to the 
traveller which allows the rope to slide into the traveller (the traveller arm 
should not be confused with the tower arm). Once the rope is inside, the 
helicopter proceeds to the next tower and repeats the operation. After several 
towers have been strung, the electrical wire is attached to the cable and pulled 
through the travellers. Electricians then climb the towers and attach the 
electrical wires to the insulators (tr.59-73). 
In this type of operation, the helicopter flies only 100 to 150 feet 
above the ground at a relatively slow speed (tr.59-73). When flying at these 
speeds and altitudes, the pilot is in what is called the "dead man's curve" 
(tr.57-59). When a pilot has a power failure in the "dead man's curve" he 
cannot achieve sufficient velocity to auto-rotate the rotor blades to permit a 
soft landing (tr.57-59). It is for this reason that the strength of the 100 
foot length of rope is extremely important. 
When a helicopter flies sideways, the rotor blades are tipped slightly 
in the direction of the travel (tr.66). The lift created by the spinning blades 
then pulls the helicopter in the desired sideway direction (tr.54-57). 
In a wire pulling operation, snags are common and cannot be prevented 
(tr.65,770). They usually occur when the rope goes between the pulleys in the 
traveller. When a snag occurs, the rope performs two functions: first, it acts 
as a shock absorber; second, as it resists the helicopter's momentum it pulls 
the helicopter from its tipped position to a horizontal position thereby 
releasing pull on the rope and the aircraft (tr.65-67). This gives the pilot 
sufficient time to cut the power and release the rope so the snag can be 
corrected (tr.67). Obviously, a weak rope is dangerous inasmuch as it may break 
and make the helicopter vulnerable to the possibility of "snap back.11 
Pursuant to the contract between Rocky Mountain and Tri-0, Groen 
arrived at the "show-up yard" (the place designated for the crew to meet before 
going to the job site). There he held a safety meeting with the crew and then 
inquired of the highest ranking Tri-0 employee, Kenneth Clinger (tr.79), if he 
could see the ropes that were being supplied by Tri-0 for use on the job 
(tr.80). Clinger noted that the actual ropes were already attached out at the 
site where the work was to be performed, but showed Groen the same type of rope 
on a spool in the show-up yard (tr.81). The rope was 1/2 inch polypropylene 
(hereinafter "PD-10") (tr.716). When Groen observed the rope, he immediately 
voiced an objection, noting that it was too small in diameter, was not the type 
of construction he had used before, and did not appear adequate (tr.80-81). 
Clinger admitted the fact of Groen's objection to the rope (tr.716-17,741). 
Groen1s objection was so forceful that Clinger thought the job may again be shut 
down (tr.749-50). Groen demanded 3/4 inch Sampson rope, noting that he had used 
it before and was satisfied as to its reliability (tr.81). Tri-01s statement in 
its brief that Groen testified differently in the first trial, i.e., that he did 
not specifically designate 3/4 inch diameter, is false. (See transcript of 
first trial, p.268). 
Inasmuch as the job was already behind schedule, dinger immediately 
began attempts to persuade Groen to use the rope over Groen's objection. In 
unequivocable terms, dinger told Groen that the rope was adequate for the job, 
that it was as strong as Sampson rope, and, referring to a large piece of 
equipment, stated "it will hold that cat over a cliff" (tr.80-81,86), These 
unequivocable statements made by Kenneth dinger were corroborated by Joe 
Candlish (tr.787). Although dinger denied making the statements, his denial 
was impeached to some extent by prior deposition testimony (tr.751,774-775) and 
cross examination established doubt as to the truth of his denial (tr.754-757), 
In a further attempt to persuade Groen to use the PD-10, dinger 
promised to send a runner to Denver to obtain the requested Sampson rope 
(741-742). Although Denver was only 100 miles away, the rope had still not 
arrived on the next day after the promise was made (tr.753-754). 
The men then went from the show-up yard to the site where the work was 
to be performed. The PD-10 rope was already assembled and needed only to be 
attached to the helicopter. Upon observing the rope, Groen again objected, 
noting the small diameter, flimsy appearance and different construction than he 
was accustomed to (tr.85-87). Groen again requested 3/4 inch Sampson rope 
(tr.86). 
In response to Groenfs second objection, and motivated by a desire to 
not further delay the already slow-moving job (tr.750), dinger again repeated 
his warranties concerning the rope, stating in unequivocable terms that it was 
adequate for the job, that it was as strong as Sampson rope, and that "it would 
hold that cat over a cliff" (tr.87). These repeated warranties by dinger were 
also corroborated by Joe Candlish (tr.790-91). 
In order to add credibility to his statements concerning the adequacy 
of the rope, Clinger stated to Groen that dinger was knowledgeable concerning 
rope strengths and had done extensive reading concerning ropes and their uses 
(tr.754-55,89-90). Groen had no experience with respect to ropes except his 
observations as to the adequacy of the 3/4 inch Sampson rope (tr.85-86,89-90). 
In making these warranties, dinger imposed no conditions regarding 
the speed of the helicopter or the technique used by the pilot in stringing the 
lines (tr.758,173,94-95). 
As pilot-in-command, Groen had the absolute right to refuse to fly if 
he felt the conditions were unsafe regardless of any provisions in the contract 
requiring flight, dinger acknowledged Groen's right to refuse to fly under 
unsafe conditions (tr.739). However, by reason of dinger's unequivocable 
assurances and his claimed expertise on the subject, Groen consented to use the 
rope (tr.90,97). 
As Groen commenced the job, he discovered that the travellers that had 
been installed on the towers were of a type not previously encountered by him. 
The primary difference was that they were not anchored and would rotate when 
contacted by the rope (tr.63). Thus, Groen had to experiment to determine how 
best to lay the rope into the traveller without rotating it (tr.63,67). He 
finally concluded that the best system was to lay the rope on the porcelain 
insulator and allow it to slide down onto the traveller arm (tr.67-68). After a 
short period of time, he was able to increase his speed using this technique 
(tr.191). The propriety of this type of experiment was confirmed by Tri-0's 
expert (tr.1047). Contrary to the claims of Tri-0, contact between the rope and 
the tower arm was unintended and infrequent (tr.68). Accidental contact with 
the tower arm is common (tr.68,1070). 
During the first day of flight, Groen was observed by Kenneth dinger, 
the individual who had made the warranties concerning the rope. Groen and 
dinger were in constant radio contact during this period of observation 
(tr.93-94,1176). After Groen became accustomed to the characteristics of the 
travellers, he was able to develop a technique and increase his speed 
(tr.93-94). During the period of dinger's observation, Groen flew at the same 
speeds and used the same technique as he used the next day when the accident 
occurred (tr. 1176-77). At no time during dinger's observations, did dinger 
tell Groen that his speed or technique invalidated the warranties that dinger 
had previously made (tr.93-94). Thus, Groen proceeded at his chosen speed and 
technique in reliance on what had been told him concerning the adequacy and 
strength of the rope. 
The first day proceeded without incident. On the second day, the 
Sampson rope had not arrived so Groen again proceeded to string the cables with 
the PD-10 rope still relying on the warranties previously stated by dinger 
(tr.97). He commenced the operation at the same speed and using the same 
technique as dinger had observed the previous day (tr.1176-77). After 
stringing approximately eight towers, the rope snagged and broke at a point near 
the tower arm (tr.101). The 100 foot length of rope snapped back in the 
direction of the helicopter and contacted the rotating mast (tr.101-02). As the 
rope wrapped around the mast, it influenced the controls causing the pitch of 
the blades to turn downward (tr.115-16). As the blades fell, they began hitting 
the body of the helicopter, severing the tail boom and ultimately removing the 
plastic bubble over the cockpit (tr.115-16). With the tail boom removed, the 
helicopter began spinning violently in the opposite direction of the rotor 
blades and the helicopter fell approximately 120 feet to the ground (tr.102-05). 
The rope that was involved in the accident, previously warranted by 
Kenneth dinger, was analyzed by the world's foremost expert on ropes, David 
Himmelfarb. His testimony established, without contradicting testimony, that 
the rope was inadequate for the job and was only a fraction of the strength of 
the weakest 3/4 inch Sampson rope (tr.402-10,400-02,Ex.22). This uncontradicted 
testimony clearly established that the warranty made by Kenneth dinger, a duly 
authorized agent of Tri-0, had been breached. 
The statements made by Tri-0 several times in its Brief that the 
landing was a "soft landing" because the rotor blades cushioned the fall is 
absolutely false. It was a violent fall with several factors simultaneously 
increasing the force. The downward pitch of the blades actually propelled the 
helicopter to the ground faster than the force of gravity. The severing of the 
tail boom caused the body of the helicopter to whirl in the opposite direction 
of the blades. The length of the fall was approximately 125 feet and the force 
of the impact was so great that it tore apart the metal seatbelt buckle 
(tr.101-05,115-16). 
Groen hit the ground in a sitting position. The force of the impact 
caused extensive tearing of the muscles in his neck and back (tr.549,553-55). 
As the muscles healed, there was extensive scar tissue remaining. The force of 
the impact also has resulted in nerve disfunction in the spinal area 
(tr.558-59). The result has been continuous pain and permanent disability of 
37-40 percent of the entire person (tr.550-51). There is nothing medical 
science can do to relieve the pain. The extent of the untreatable pain was so 
great that Groen was ultimately referred to the L.D.S. Hospital Pain Clinic and 
participated in a program to assist him in psychologically coping with the pain 
(tr.548,267-77,124-136). 
Groen had always had a desire to become a pilot from early childhood 
(tr.39). On the date of this accident, he intended on continuing as a career 
pilot (tr.148). After graduation from high school, he joined the Army inasmuch 
as it was the only branch of service that would accept an applicant for flight 
training without a college education (tr.39). He entered the Army's flight 
school for the purpose of commencing a career as a helicopter pilot (tr.39-40). 
He served gallantly in Vietnam and was shot down seven times. On each occasion 
his skill as a pilot enabled him to make a soft landing. 
After his discharge from the Army, Groen immediately sought work as a 
helicopter pilot. Due to the unavailability of immediate work he worked unsuc-
cessfully as a salesman (tr. 40-42). He finally obtained his first job as a 
helicopter pilot in February, 1973 (tr. 40). At the time of the accident in 
May, 1977, he was one of the most respected pilots in his field (tr.1052). 
After the accident, Groen made eyery attempt to hold onto his chosen 
vocation. However, the rigors of wire pulling—the area where he was most 
talented--was abandoned inasmuch as it required him to bend sideways. At the 
time of the first trial (January, 1981) he was still flying. However, he 
frequently had to ground himself due to extreme pain or the effects of pain 
medications. Moreover, he had to accept piloting jobs that required less effort 
and resulted in lower pay (tr.126-129,162,601-02,ex.64). 
Soon the rigors of his chosen profession were too much and Groen 
permanently discontinued flying in the summer of 1981 (tr.149). He was turned 
down for a flight physical shortly prior to the second triar ' (tr.150,ex.53). 
His treating physician confirmed that Groen will never fly again (tr.553). 
Having no other job skills (tr.38), and being physically unable to do any medium 
or heavy work, Groen's earning capacity went from the lucrative salary of a 
helicopter pilot to a level near the minimum wage (tr.448-49). Even at minimum 
wage, job availability is limited inasmuch as his injuries preclude him from 
full-time employment (tr.450). 
Groen knew before taking the physical that he could not pass it. He took 
the physical at the request of his attorney so there would be no doubt in 
the matter (tr.150). 
Fortunately, Groen's brothers started a recycling company and hired 
Groen as a bookkeeper (tr.326-27). Due to family considerations, he was paid 
more than he could earn in a competitive climate (tr.451,163). However, the 
salary is much less than he would earn as a helicopter pilot and the continued 
survival of the new recycling business is uncertain (tr.326,341). 
At the time of the second trial, Groen was employed in the family 
business earning $250.00 per week when the business could afford to pay him 
(tr.326,123). He was still plagued by continuous pain and disability 
(tr.129-135). There was competent evidence that his loss of earning capacity 
alone was in excess of One Million Dollars (Ex.74). The jury found in favor of 
Respondents and awarded Groen damages of $975,000 (R.1599). The value of the 
helicopter was stipulated to be $37,500. 
After the commencement of the appeal in this matter, Groen filed a 
motion for an accelerated hearing based upon the fact that, unlike the vast 
majority of litigants presently involved in appeals before this Court, he has 
been twice subjected to the appeal process with the delays inherent therein. 
Since the date of the accident in May, 1977, a period of more than eight years, 
Groen has experienced a standard of living drastically below the level of his 
capabilities prior to the accident together with a daily pattern of pain and 
disability without any compensation from the party which the jury found to be 
responsible for such damage. Groen respectfully requests the Court to bear in 
mind the period of his hardship in rendering a decision in this matter. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The argument that the law of express warranty is inapplicable to 
the circumstances of this case is resolved by this Court's prior decision in 
this matter. 
II. Despite the fact that there was no money or other item of value 
paid to Tri-0, the warranty is nevertheless enforceable by reason of Respond-
ents' detrimental reliance and modification of an executory contract. Moreover, 
Groen's reliance cannot be considered as the performance of a pre-existing 
contractual duty. Despite the existence of the contract between Tri-0 and Rocky 
Mountain, Groen was not obligated to proceed inasmuch as a pilot-in-command need 
not fly if he regards conditions as being unsafe, 
III. There was competent and persuasive evidence that the warranty was 
the cause of the accident and that Groen did not misuse the rope. Tri-0's 
argument to the contrary is merely an attempt to persuade this Court to weigh 
the evidence thereby invading the province of the jury. 
IV. Tri-0 admitted at trial that instructions 10-13 considered 
individually were accurate statements of the law. Tri-0 now argues that the 
"cumulative effect" of these instructions makes the warranties appear absolute. 
The jury instructions clearly stated, over the objections of Respondents, that 
there were limitations on the warranties. 
V. Evidence of the book to which Groen contributed was not "newly 
discovered evidence" within the meaning of Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. All available evidence concerning the book was at the disposal of 
Tri-0 prior to the conclusion of the trial and much of this evidence was in fact 
presented to the jury. 
VI. The summary of evidence of the economist was necessary by reason 
of many alternative factual circumstances. Some of the alternative factual 
circumstances reflected concessions made by the witness on cross examination. 
Tri-0 was free to submit its own exhibit had it so desired. 
VII. During the trial, Respondents suggested a verdict form separately 
stating special and general damages. The form used, which did not separately 
state special and general damages, was prepared and submitted by Tri-O. Tri-0 
has therefore waived any objection to the form. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF EXPRESS WARRANTY IS APPROPRIATE 
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
After failing in the first appeal in this matter to convince this 
Court to refuse application of the law of express warranty to the circumstance 
of this case, Tri-0 submits the same argument again asking the Court to re-
examine and overrule a decision that is barely two years old thereby changing 
the law of the case and making the second trial in this matter superfluous. No 
reasons are given other than the reasons argued on the first appeal. 
The evidence considered by the Court during the course of the first 
appeal and the evidence to be considered in this appeal are substantially 
identical insofar as liability is concerned. In fact, much of the evidence 
presented at the second trial was read from the transcript of the first trial. 
Those witnesses that appeared personally testified as to the same facts and 
circumstances as in the first trial. Thus, there is nothing that would change 
the Court's prior decision. 
This Court in the first appeal clearly and unequivocably held that the 
law of express warranty is applicable in the circumstances of this case. That 
decision was based on an extensive analysis of decisions of this and other 
Courts. Therefore, in response to Tri-0's argument, Respondents rely on the 
best and most persuasive authority on the subject, Groen vs. Tri-0, Inc., 667 
P.2d 598 (Utah 1983), and the case cited therein. 
It is interesting to note, that Tri-0 admits the applicability of the 
law of express warranties to leases and bailments. The admission is supported 
by prior decisions of this Court. Shurtleff vs. Jay Tuft & Co., 622 P.2d 1168 
(Utah 1980); Acme Crane Rental Co. vs. Ideal Cement Co., 14 Utah 2d 300, 383 
P.2d 487 (1963). Tri-0 ignores the similarity between the facts of this case 
and a lease or bailment situation and makes no attempt to distinguish the 
similar circumstances. Certainly the transaction involved in the instant case 
is more nearly related to situations where express warranties are traditionally 
applicable than in Quagliana vs. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538 P.2d 301 
(Utah 1975) (express warranty arising out of contract for professional services) 
and Welchman vs. Wood, 10 Utah 2d 325, 353 P.2d 165 (1960) (express warranty 
arising out of real estate transaction). In both cases, this Court applied the 
law of express warranty. 
Respondents submit that it would be an extraordinary decision for a 
Court to overrule a prior decision in the same case. Such a decision would 
ignore the time limits on a motion for rehearing (Rule 35, U.R.A.P.) and would 
violate the doctrine of res judicata. See Searle Bros, vs. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 
(Utah 1978); In re Town of West Jordan, 326 P.2d 105 (Utah 1958); Tolman vs. 
Tolman, 461 P.2d 433 (Idaho 1969). 
POINT II 
THE EXPRESS WARRANTY IS NOT UNENFORCEABLE DUE TO 
LACK OF CONSIDERATION 
A. The Warranty is Enforceable by Reason of Groen's Detrimental 
Reliance. 
The conversation between Groen and Clinger was not mere passing 
comments. Because Groen would be flying in the "dead man's curve," the 
strength, structure and propensities of the rope were of critical importance to 
his life and safety (tr.65,762). Clinger admitted that Groen's objection was so 
significant that Clinger believed Groen would refuse to fly (tr.749-750)—a 
right reserved by the pilot-in-command regardless of any contractual provision 
(tr.739). 
Since the job had already been substantially delayed and the Highway 
Patrol was ready to stop traffic for the pull over the highway, Clinger realized 
that he must be persuasive in order to induce Groen to fly with the PD-10 rope 
(tr.750). It was is this context that Clinger noted his extensive expertise 
with respect to the strengths and applications of rope and unequivocably stated 
that the rope "would hold a cat over a cliff,11 it was adequate for the job and 
was just as strong as Sampson. The last statement was known by Clinger to be 
false (tr.766). 
Groen relied on these statements and used the rope (tr.90,94,101). 
This reliance on the part of Groen provides a sufficient basis to enforce the 
warranty. Section 90, Restatement (2d), Contracts (1977) provides as follows: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to 
induce action or forebearance on the part of the promisee or 
a third person and which does induce such action or for-
bearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by the 
enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach 
may be limited as justice requires. 
This Court has accepted the principle set forth in Section 90. Union Tankcar 
Co. vs. Wheat Brothers, 15 Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000 (1964). 
The most persuasive authority on the subject is Quagliana vs. Ex-
quisite Home Builders, Inc., 538 P.2nd 301 (Utah 1975). In that case plaintiff 
desired to build a home from some plans that plaintiff had already obtained. 
Plaintiff entered into a contract with an engineer to modify the plans. The 
engineer modified the plans and therefore performed the contract. However, at 
the time the contract was performed, plaintiff had not yet selected a lot upon 
which to build the home. 
When plaintiff finally selected the lot, plaintiff asked the engineer 
to determine if the lot was suitable for the house and objectives plaintiff 
desired with respect to the house. The engineer inspected the lot and un-
equivocably stated to plaintiff that the lot was adequate. In reliance on that 
statement—which statement was extraneous to the original contract—plaintiff 
purchased the lot and commenced construction. It was later discovered, during 
the course of construction, that the lot was totally inadequate for the home. 
This Court held that despite the absence of any additional con-
sideration for the engineer's statement concerning the adequacy of the specific 
lot, the engineer's statement constituted a warranty that was enforceable by 
reason of plaintiff's reliance thereon. In support of the holding, this Court 
cited Restatement, Contracts (2d), Section 90. 
B. The Warranty Was a Modification of an Executory Contract and Therefore Does 
Not Require Additional Consideration. 
A warranty is an agreement which refers to the subject matter of a 
contract, but which is collateral to its main purpose. 17A C.J.S. §342. It may 
be made during contract negotiations or after a contract is entered into. If it 
is made after the contract is entered into, there is authority that it is to be 
treated as a contract modification without the necessity of additional 
consideration. 
The notes to U.C.C. §2-313, which discuss the general common law of 
express warranty as well as the statutory law relating to sales, state that a 
warranty should be treated as a contract modification. Note 7 to §2-313 states 
the following with respect to express warranties: 
The precise time when words of description or affirmation 
are made or samples are shown is not material. The sole 
question is whether the language or samples or models are 
fairly to be regarded as part of the contract. If the 
language is used after the closing of the deal ... the 
warranty becomes a modification, and need not be supported 
by consideration if it is otherwise reasonable and in order. 
In Quagliana vs. Exquisite Home Builders, Supra, this Court, as an alternative 
holding to that previously described, confirmed that a warranty made after the 
formation of a contract was enforceable as a contract modification. 
Section 89 of the Restatement, (2d), of Contracts states: 
A promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully 
performed on either side is binding: (a) if the modification 
is fair and equitable in view of the circumstances not 
anticipated by the parties when the contract was made; or 
(b) to the extent provided by statute; or (c) to the extent 
that justice requires enforcement in view of material change 
of position in reliance on the promise. 
It is clear that all of the requisites of Section 89 are present in 
this instance and that the contract modification should be enforced. 
In the instant case, the factual circumstances lend themselves to a 
permissible contract modification. The contract between Tri-0 and Rocky 
Mountain did not specify the diameter, structure or strength of the rope that 
was to be supplied by Tri-0 (Ex.18). Thus, when this unforeseen circumstance 
arose, it was necessary for the parties to negotiate further in the face of 
Groen1s genuine concern for his own safety. It was in these circumstances that 
Groen objected to the rope, and Clinger stated the express warranties with 
respect to the rope in order to induce Groen to abandon his objection. 
Other circumstances also lend themselves to construe the conversation 
between Groen and Clinger as a modification of the contract. Groen, as pilot-
in-command, had an absolute right to refuse to fly if he deemed flight unsafe 
despite any pre-existing contract (tr.739). Thus, it is erroneous to state that 
Groen had a pre-existing duty to fly under these circumstances. In fact, 
Clinger believed that Groen was going to exercise this right on the first day of 
flying (tr.749-750). Thus, the warranties stated by Clinger addressed Groen's 
right to refuse to fly and therefore constituted a modification of the 
agreement. 
On the basis of the foregoing, the warranty was enforceable either on 
the basis of detrimental reliance or modification or an executory contract, or 
both. 
POINT III 
THE JURY'S FINDINGS OF CAUSATION AND ABSENCE OF MISUSE WERE 
SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT AND PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE 
A. The Opinion of Dr. Flandro Together With Other Evidence Provided a Sound 
Basis for the Jury to Reject the Testimony of Dr. Or!oft. 
Prior to trial, Dr. Kenneth Orloft created a complex computer program 
which he testified was based on tests he had made on the strengths of various 
component parts of the frame of a similar helicopter. Using this program, and 
using the given breaking strengths of various ropes, he concluded that if Groen 
had been using 3/4 inch Sampson rope, the rope would not have broken but the 
helicopter would have been torn apart. 
Tri-0 argues that this testimony was uncontroverted in that Dr. Gary 
A. Flandro, who rendered a contrary opinion, was not qualified to do so inasmuch 
as Dr. Flandro had not conducted similar tests with respect to the strengths of 
the frame of the helicopter. This contention has no merit. Dr. Flandro, having 
not conducted similar tests of the frame of the helicopter, assumed all of Dr. 
Orloft's data was true (tr.1161). Thus, it made no difference that he had not 
personally compiled the data used by Dr. Orloft. In overruling Tri-O's 
objection that Dr. Flandro had not conducted sufficient studies and tests, the 
Court recognized the basis upon which Dr. Flandro was testifying: "my 
understanding his testimony is hefs accepting all of the data as produced by 
your [Tri-O's] expert witness in simply giving an opinion with that as his 
basis" (tr.1163). 
After assuming the truth of Dr. Orloft's analysis, Dr. Flandro 
testified that by reason of the large number of complex variables necessary to 
make such conclusions, Dr. Orloft1s conclusions as to what would occur in the 
hypothetical situation were unreliable (tr.1162-64). 
Dr. Flandro is well qualified in the field of mechanical engineering 
and aerodynamics (tr.283-86). The jury was entitled to accept his testimony 
over that of Dr. Orloft. 
It is important to note, that the jury could reasonably reject the 
testimony of Dr. Orloft without even considering the testimony of Dr. Flandro. 
There were several fatal flaws in Dr. Orloft's analysis and, in addition, there 
was competent testimony from witnesses other than Dr. Flandro that contradicted 
the conclusions of Dr. Orloft. 
First, as previously noted, the rope is attached to a side hook on the 
helicopter located at the horizontal center of gravity of the helicopter. As 
the helicopter flies sideways, it is tipped in the direction of travel. The 
force created by the blades is then in line with the rope and exerts its maximum 
force against the helicopter and the rope. When a snag occurs, and tension 
increases in the rope, and the tension automatically pulls the helicopter from 
its tipped position to a horizontal position thereby relieving much of the force 
exerted directly against the helicopter and rope causing the helicopter to move 
back in the direction of the rope thereby removing the force. This phenomenon 
was confirmed by David Groen (tr.65-67,197-98,333-34,1177), by Don Lederhous 
(Tri-O's expert in helicopter operation) (tr.1049) and by Dr. Flandro 
(tr.291-92). It is apparent that this phenomenon is critical to an accurate 
assessment of the forces exerted on the helicopter in the event of a snag. The 
critical nature of the phenomenon was admitted by Dr. Orloft (tr.1153-54). Dr. 
Orloft further admitted that his computer program did not take into account this 
phenomenon (tr.1130-33). On this basis alone, the jury could reasonably reject 
Dr. Orloftfs conclusions. 
Second, Dr. Or!oft was unaware that the rope was attached to the 
helicopter through a small metal arch that was welded to the frame (tr.1132-35). 
The small arch can be seen on Exhibit 87. It was apparent to anyone, including 
Dr. Or!oft, that the small metal arch would be torn away long before the 
helicopter frame would be damaged (tr.1132-35). This obvious fact was confirmed 
by Dr. Flandro (tr.1164-69). The tearing away of the metal arch would not 
threaten the safety of the pilot inasmuch as the hook would automatically 
release (tr.1157-58). Dr. Orloft admitted that he did not know the amount of 
force required 
to tear the metal arch away from the helicopter (tr.1135). Dr. Orloft further 
admitted that if the small welded metal arch was torn away, there would be no 
stress placed on the frame of the helicopter (tr.1135). This evidence totally 
undermined the testimony of Dr. Orloft and provided the jury with another sound 
basis to reject his conclusions. 
Third, Groen testified that he had previously experienced snags at 
thirty miles per hour and the rope did not break and the helicopter was not 
damaged (tr.1177). The jury could reasonably accept this testimony over that of 
Dr. Orloft. 
Finally, assuming, for the sake of argument, that the helicopter would 
be damaged as Dr. Orloft speculated, it would not necessarily mean that a crash 
would occur (tr.1177). This fact was admitted by Dr. Orloft (tr.1142-44). 
Thus, Tri-0 failed in its burden of proof that the failure of the rope was not 
the cause of the accident. 
B. There Was Competent Evidence From Which the Jury Could Find That Groen Did 
Not Misuse the Rope. 
Tri-0 argues that despite the fact that Clinger made no mention of any 
limitation on the warranties, he nevertheless subjectively intended a limitation 
with respect to speed and technique and that Groenfs speed and technique 
exceeded the scope of the warranty and thereby constituted misuse of the rope. 
Tri-0 contends that the trial Court, as a matter of law, should have found that 
Groen misused the rope. 
There is no legal basis for this argument. The law is clear that a 
warrantor must state any limitations on his warranty J.I. Case Credit Corp. vs. 
Andreason, 408 P.2d 165 (Idaho 1965).. Clinger gave no indication of any 
restrictions or limitations on the warranty (tr.173). The limitations, if any, 
were known only to Clinger. Moreover, the jury could have found that Clinger 
had no subjective limitation as to speed, inasmuch as, at the 
time he made the warranty, he had no opinion as to how fast a helicopter should 
travel while stringing line (tr.748). 
Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that dinger's subjective 
limitations are relevant, there is a sound factual basis for the jury to find 
that Clinger did not intend such limitations. After making the warranties, 
Clinger observed Groen pulling the rope at the same speeds and using the same 
technique as he used on the day of the accident. At the time of the obser-
vation, Clinger and Groen were in radio contact with each other (tr. 
93-94,1176-77). While observing Groen's technique and a speed of 20-30 miles 
per hour, Clinger made no comment about "unorthodox" flying or his alleged 
subjective limitations on the warranty (tr.93-94). Therefore, Groen could 
reasonably believe that he was not exceeding the scope of the warranty, i.e., 
misusing the rope. Moreover, from this evidence the jury could reasonably 
conclude that dinger had no subjective limitations on the warranty and did not 
believe that Groen's speed was "unorthodox." 
On the day of the accident, John David, a duly authorized agent of 
Tri-0 and the second-in-command at the job-site, was also present when Clinger 
made the warranty. John David observed Groen's entire flight on the date of the 
accident. Despite radio contact between John David and Groen, he likewise did 
not make any comment about restrictions on the warranty or the alleged "un-
orthodox" speed and technique (tr.98,101). 
If Tri-0 is assumed not to have any duty to state any restrictions or 
limitations on the warranty at the time it was made, it certainly should have 
such a duty when the agents who made the warranty observe the limitations or 
restrictions being exceeded. The failure to make any statement as to Groen's 
speed or technique further provides the jury with a sound basis to conclude that 
no restrictions of limitations of the warranty were intended. 
Tri-0's claim that Groen's technique and speed were "unorthodox" is 
not supported by the evidence. The evidence established that there is no 
generally accepted standard with respect to speed or technique. Tri-0's claim 
of "unorthodox" flying is based solely on a comparision of the practices of 
other pilots, primarily Don Lederhous. In this regard, Don Lederhous testified 
as follows: 
Q. We've talked a lot about how everybody else strings wire 
in this proceeding. Wouldn't it be true, Mr. Lederhous, 
that there really is no single correct method of flying 
wire? 
A. That's probably correct, yes. 
Q. And under different conditions and given the different 
talents of pilots, their technique, their speed, all of 
the things may differ? 
A. That's true. 
Q. There's no accepted standard of flying wire that you 
know of? 
A. Not that I know of, no. I would say that it'd be up to 
the pilot. 
Q. And speaking generally about-let me ask this. Given one 
pilot's technique, you wouldn't say that he's doing it 
wrong merely because he does it differently than you do? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And when we have had pilots look at other pilots up in 
the air and say that's the way that guy does it, that 
doesn't mean that guy is right and another guy is wrong? 
A. That's true (tr.1044). 
After admitting that Groen's greater speed and different technique did 
not necessarily mean that Groen was wrong, Lederhous admitted that he has pulled 
wire at speeds of 25 miles per hour and that there could be a 5 mile per hour 
margin of error in his estimate (tr.1051-52). Thus, he may have flown as fast 
as Groen was flying on the date of the accident. Lederhous further admitted 
that he has observed other pilots stringing wire at speeds 20-25 miles per hour 
(tr.1051). 
The evidence is clear that Groen was more experienced and talented 
than other pilots who did wire pulls (tr.1052,50). From this evidence, the jury 
could conclude that Groen's greater speed and different technique were the 
product of his experience and talent rather than a departure from a non-existent 
standard of care. 
Even if Lederhous had testified that Groen's speed and technique were 
"unorthodox," his testimony was contradicted by Groen who also was a qualified 
expert (tr.93-94). The jury had the perogative of accepting Groen's testimony 
over that of Lederhous. This evidence alone precludes the Court from finding, 
as a matter of law, that Groen misused the rope. 
Even if the evidence supported Tri-0's claim that Groen's speed of 
20-30 miles per hour constituted "unorthodox" flying, it makes no difference 
inasmuch as there is no causal connection between the speed and the failure of 
the rope. Tri-0's expert witness acknowledged that speeds as fast as 20 miles 
per hour is acceptable (tr.1048-49). The same witness stated that an average 
speed is 15 miles per hour (tr.1048-49). There is a 5 mile per hour margin of 
error in both figures (tr.1049-52). The uncontradicted testimony established 
that the rope would have broken at a speed of 16 miles per hour 
(tr.1145-46,288). Thus, even if Groen was flying at speeds acceptable to Tri-0, 
the accident would still have occurred. Therefore, any speed in excess of 16 
miles per hour has no causal connection with the accident. 
With respect to Groen's technique of laying the rope on the in-
sulators, no one offered any testimony that such a practice was unreasonable or 
that such a practice increased the risk of accident. Even if such testimony 
were offered, the jury was entitled to accept Groen!s testimony that such 
practice was acceptable. 
During the course of the first trial in this matter, the same evidence 
now asserted in support of Tri-0's claim of product misuse was asserted in 
support of a claim of Groen's negligence. The jury in the first trial ex-
onerated Groen of any negligence. The jury in the second trial exonerated Groen 
of any product misuse. In the face of these findings, it would be an extra-
ordinary ruling to find product misuse as a matter of law. 
There was persuasive evidence that Groen's speed and technique were 
proper in the circumstances. Even in the absence of such evidence, Groen's 
speed and technique had no causal connection with the accident. Thus, there is 
no basis to find product misuse as a matter of law. 
POINT IV 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON EXPRESS WARRANTY 
WERE ACCURATE STATEMENTS OF THE LAW 
Tri-0 complains that instructions 10-13 "had the cumulative effect of 
conveying to the jury that warranties are absolute and not subject to limi-
tation, and inadequately informed the jury that, unless the parties contemplated 
otherwise, objective standards are to be applied in determining the scope of the 
warranty." Not a single case is cited in support of Tri-O's contentions. 
Moreover, in taking its exceptions, Tri-0 acknowledged that each individual 
instruction was proper (tr. 921-922). 
A review of each instruction, and consideration of their cumulative 
effect, establishes that they are neither "inadequate" nor "erroneous." 
Although Tri-0 makes no separate argument concerning Instruction No. 
10, Respondents will discuss each instruction separately including Instruction 
No. 10. 
A. Instruction No. 10. 
Tri-0 did not except to Instruction No. 10 and has, therefore, waived 
any objection (tr. 921-927). Even if such objection had not been waived, there 
is no error in the instruction. The legal principles therein set forth are all 
supported by language in the Court's opinion in the first appeal in this matter. 
B. Instruction No. 11. 
All of the wording in Instruction No. 11 is taken from the language 
used by the Court in its opinion in the first appeal. See Groen vs. 
Tri-0-Inc., Supra, at p. 604. 
C. Instruction No. 12. 
All of the wording in Instruction No. 12 is taken from the language 
used by the Court in its opinion in the first appeal. See Groen vs. Tri-0-Inc, 
Supra, at p. 604. 
D. Instruction No. 13. 
Instruction No. 13 is an accurate statement of the law. J.I. Case 
Credit Corp. vs. Andreason, 408 P.2d 165 (Idaho 1965). 
E. Cumulative Effect of Instructions 10-13. 
The wording of Instruction 13 contains the following statement: 
11
 ... the recipient of the warranty has the right to assume that there are no 
restrictions or limitations unless he is otherwise aware of such restrictions or 
limitations or such limitations or restrictions should be reasonably foreseen by 
the recipient of the warranty ...." This language is a generous concession to 
Tri-0 and overcomes its claim that the instructions had the cumulative effect of 
"conveying to the jury that warranties are absolute and not subject to limi-
tation" and "objective standards are to be applied in determining the scope of 
the warranty." Appellant's Brief, p. 40. The generous concession given to 
Tri-0 is demonstrated by the holding in J.I. Case Credit Corp. vs. Andreason, 
408 P.2d 165 (Idaho 1965), that a warrantor has a duty to state any limitations 
on his warranty. 
F, Instruction No. 17. 
Defendant complains that Instruction No. 17, stating that in the prior 
trial neither party was found negligent, was "prejudicial to defendant." 
Appellant's Brief, p. 42. The source of the prejudice is difficult to determine 
from Tri-0's argument. Apparently the gravamen of Tri-0's complaint is not that 
the statement is inaccurate, but that the statement was contained in Instruction 
17 which also dealt with product misuse. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 41-42. 
Tri-0 makes no explanation as to why the statement of an actual fact constitutes 
error because of its placement in the instructions. Tri-0 has no complaint that 
the instructions inadequately deal with its misuse defense thereby making it 
difficult to understand how Tri-0 is prejudiced by the instruction. 
A review of Instructions 13 and 14 establishes that the defense of 
misuse was properly presented to the jury leaving Tri-0 with no cause for 
complaint. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING 
A NEW TRIAL ON THE BASIS OF NEWLY DISOVERED EVIDENCE 
RELATING TO A BOOK TO WHICH GROEN CONTRIBUTED 
Tri-0 asserts that the facts surrounding the writing and publication 
of the book Huey constituted "newly discovered evidence" under Rule 59, 
U.R.C.P., thereby justifying a new trial. 
A review of the wording of Rule 59 demonstrates that the argument is 
without merit. The relevant wording of the Rule is as follows: 
In order for a new trial to be granted on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence the moving party must show: ... (b) by 
due diligence the evidence could not have been discovered 
and produced at trial; and (c) the evidence must not be 
merely cumulative or incidental but must be of sufficient 
substance that there is a reasonable likelihood that with it 
there would have been a different result. 
The existence of the book was discovered prior to the end of the 
trial. Moreover, Groen and his brother and co-author, Jay, were present in the 
courtroom to answer any questions concerning the book. Groen answered all 
questions submitted to him concerning the book (tr.613-26). Tri-0 did not call 
Jay Groen despite his presence in the courtroom during most of the trial. Thus, 
the existence of the book and any facts relating thereto cannot possibly be 
deemed to constitute "evidence [that] could not have been discovered and 
produced at trial." 
Rule 59 further requires that the newly discovered evidence "must be 
of sufficient substance that there is a reasonable likelihood that with it there 
would have been a different result." Inasmuch as all relevant evidence con-
concerning the book was presented at trial, there is no reason to believe that 
presentation of the same evidence at another trial would influence the result. 
The evidence concerning the book has little relevance to the issues 
involved in the case. Groen's success with the book was obviously a one-time 
enterprise. At the time of trial, he was not working on another book and had no 
plans to do so (tr.626-27). Moreover, his sole contribution to the book was 
relating combat experiences and reviewing Jay Groen's manuscript describing 
those experiences (tr.623-25). Thus, Groen did not author the manuscript and, 
given the absence of any other newsworthy experiences, he has no hope of a 
repeat performance. Thus, the existence of the book, and any success relating 
thereto, is irrelevant to Groen's loss of earning capacity as a helicopter 
pilot. 
The issue in the instant litigation was the fact that Groen had been 
deprived of his ability to function in his chosen profession. The fact that 
Groen may have some measure of literary talent does not bear on the fact that he 
was deprived of his livelihood. 
Tri-0 contends that Groen intentionally concealed the existence of the 
book in pre-trial deposition testimony and at trial. Assuming, for the sake of 
argument only, that such a claim had merit, it goes only to the credibility of 
Groen which is a matter for the jury only. Moreover, Tri-O's claim of con-
cealment has no basis in fact. First, as previously noted, the existence of the 
book has little relevance to Groen's loss of ability to function in his profes-
sion. This is especially so inasmuch as the book was obviously a one-time 
venture. Thus, there was little motivation to conceal the existence of the 
book. Secondly, at the time Groen was asked in a pre-trial deposition about 
other sources of income, he had not received any income from the book (tr.615). 
The deposition took place in December, 1983, prior to the time the book had been 
published and prior to the time that Groen had received any revenue (tr.615). 
Thus, his denial of other sources of income was accurate. At the time of trial, 
he was asked if he had any "hobbies" (tr. 612-13). Such a question does not 
necessarily call for an explanation of the book inasmuch as a one-time venture, 
then completed, is not the equivalent of a "hobby." 
There was no intent on Groen's part to conceal sales figures* When 
Groen was asked questions concerning sales figures, he stated "I don't know 
exactly" (tr.615) and noted the sales figures were only furnished by the 
publisher every six months (tr.615). Despite his lack of knowledge, and after 
he explained that exact figures were readily available from the most recent 
accounting, Tri-0 encouraged his estimate (tr.615). Groen, in response, 
estimated 20,000 copies based on dividing his recollection of his total 
royalties by the per-book royalties (tr.615-616). Again, emphasizing his lack 
of specific recollection, he admitted sales could be as high as 50,000 copies, 
which turned out to be accurate (See Supplementary record). Tri-0 never 
requested the publisher's accounting which was then readily available and would 
have showed sales of 50,000 copies. It is, therefore, apparent that Tri-0 had 
little regard for the relevance of the evidence with respect to the book. 
After the trial, a newspaper article appeared in the Salt Lake Tribune 
stating that the book had sales of 170,000 (See Supplementary record). In 
response, Tri-0 moved for leave to conduct post-trial discovery on sales 
figures. However, at the time of the motion, Groen had received an updated 
accounting which was immediately delivered to Tri-0. The accounting established 
that the sales figures were far below 170,000 (See Supplementary record). Upon 
receipt of the accounting, Tri-0 abandoned its request for post-trial discovery. 
The evidence establishes that the 170,000 figure reported in the newspaper 
related to the number of books in print rather than to the number of sales (See 
affidavit of Jay Groen, R.1584). 
POINT VI 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN ADMITTING EXHIBIT ,,74H INTO EVIDENCE 
AS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE ECONOMIST 
Tri-0 contends that the lower Court erred in admitting Exhibit 74 into 
evidence, a summary of the conclusions of economist Dr. Samuel Stewart. Prior 
to Dr. Stewart's appearance at trial, Groen had called several witnesses to 
obtain foundational facts for Dr. Stewart's conclusions. The facts, dealing 
with future loss of income, involved the inherent problem of predicting the 
future course of events. Thus, the universe of alternatives and the probability 
of each alternative were considered. 
Involved in the analysis were several alternative questions: would the 
future salaries of helicopter pilots increase at the same rate as the preceding 
five years, or would it increase at the inflation rate? Although Groen was 
capable of only part-time employment at the time of trial, would he be able to 
work full-time at some future date? Although Groen's earning capacity was at 
the minimum wage, he was working in a family business where, due to 
family-related concessions, he was receiving a salary in excess of his earning 
capacity. Would this newly-formed family business succeed and provide him with 
income in excess of his earning capacity or would it fail thereby forcing Groen 
into a competitive environment where he would be reduced to the minimum wage? 
With these variables, and evidence bearing on the likelihood of each 
variable, there were eight difference factual circumstances open for the jury's 
consideration. In order to permit the jury to know the monetary loss 
attributable to each factual alternative, Dr. Stewart calculated the loss under 
all eight alternatives. It became readily apparent that no one could remember 
the details of all eight alternatives or the monetary figure attributable to 
each alternative. Thus, Groen prepared Exhibit 74 so that the facts involved 
in each alternative and the computation with respect to each alternative could 
be easily reviewed. In this manner, the jury was not compelled to rely on their 
recollection of each complicated alternative, thereby reducing the risk of 
speculation and error. Under the circumstances, there is no reasonable basis to 
conclude that the admission of Exhibit 74 constituted an abuse of discretion. 
There is no claim that the Exhibit contained any error in summarizing 
the testimony. Tri-01s complaint is that the document could not be contested 
during cross-examination and that it made no mention of "concessions'1 made by 
Dr. Stewart during cross-examination. The claim that the document, having been 
produced after Dr. Stewart's testimony, was not subject to cross-examination is 
without merit. All of the testimony summarized in the Exhibit was orally stated 
by Dr. Stewart (tr.628-39,664-66) and Tri-0 conducted extensive cross-
examination on each point (tr.639-64,666-70). 
The claim that the exhibit was prejudicial and did not reflect 
concessions made by Dr. Stewart on cross-examination is also without merit. 
First, Tri-0 was free to submit its own exhibit reflecting the claimed 
"concessions." As noted by the trial court, in denying Tri-O's post-trial 
motions: "the Court received numerous illustrative exhibits from the defendant, 
and would have received any exhibit illustrative of defendant's theory of 
damages which was supported by competent testimony" (R.1609). Secondly, Exhibit 
74 did reflect some of the points made by Tri-0 in cross-examination, i.e., the 
possibility that the recycling business would succeed. 
POINT VII 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN AWARDING PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
ON SPECIAL DAMAGES 
Tri-0 complains that the award of prejudgment interest on special 
damages constituted error because the verdict form did not permit the jury to 
state what portion of the judgment was attributable to special damages. The 
argument is without merit for two reasons: first, it was Tri-0 that prepared and 
submitted the verdict form; second, there was no basis in the evidence that 
could reasonably lead the jury to believe that Groen was not entitled to all 
special damages. Inasmuch as stipulations by counsel and uncontroverted evi-
dence establish that all such expenditures were necessary and reasonable, each 
of the above arguments will be separately discussed. 
Tri-0 did register an objection to the use of a general verdict form 
rather than a special verdict form. However, once overruled, Tri-0 prepared and 
submitted the general verdict form that was ultimately used by the Court and 
which omitted any reference to special damages. Unfortunately, however, there 
is no mention in the record of the fact the general verdict form originated with 
Tri-0. Respondents must rely on the good faith and recollection of opposing 
counsel to establish the origin of the form. Assuming the fact is established, 
Tri-0 has waived any objection to the verdict form. Some evidence that Tri-0 
did not request a verdict with a separate statement of special and general 
damages is that Tri-0's special verdict form (which was not used) contained no 
space for the separate finding of special and general damages (R.1510A). A 
general verdict form that separately stated special and general damages was 
suggested by counsel for Respondents (tr.926). 
Even if Tri-0 did not waive its objection to the form of the general 
verdict, it was not prejudiced by the failure of the form to permit a separate 
finding of special damages inasmuch as there was no evidence upon which the jury 
could reasonably exclude any item of special damage. 
Groen identified the physicians that he had seen for treatment of the 
pain and other systems that began at the time of the accident (tr.584-586) and 
the amount of money expended for these services (tr.586). Tri-0 offered no 
evidence that any of these services were unnecessary or that the charges were 
unreasonable. Although Tri-0 had some reservations about the necessity of 
chiropractic services, the evidence established the necessity of those services 
(tr.544-45). 
CONCLUSION 
The proceedings in the trial court permitted all parties to fully 
present their claims and defenses. On the basis of such presentation, the jury 
decided the contested issues in favor of Respondents. Such a verdict, and 
judgment, rendered more than eight years after the accident, was based on 
credible and competent evidence and should be sustained. 
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